The Kansas State Guard in World War II

Many people today, both civilian and military, fail to recognize the difference between the National Guard and the State Guard. A State Guard is a distinctly State organization which functions to maintain order within the state while the National Guard is in Federal Service. Twice during this century the Kansas National Guard has been federalized and while it was on federal duty, a State Guard was organized to protect and defend the citizens of the state - in essence a State Militia.

On 23 December 1940, as a consequence of the increasing state of tensions in Europe, the National Guard, including the Kansas units, was federalized. The logical response to the crisis came from the Kansas Legislature by the passage of the State Guard Act of 15 April 1941. Under the provisions of this legislation the Kansas State Guard consisted of one regiment of infantry divided into companies and battalions. The regiment was designated as the 1st Infantry Regiment of the Kansas State Guard and its authorized strength was not to exceed thirty-three companies.

In many ways the State and National Guard were a study in contrasts. One striking difference was that the State Guard was not subject to call up and federal authorities considered the State Guard as solely a state military organization. But in terms of service, membership in the State Guard did not exclude an individual from his selective service obligation. The War Department's 1941 regulations, however, clearly stated, "The State authority concerned should provide for the prompt discharge from the State Guard of such of its members as are inducted, enlisted, or otherwise engaged in the active military service of the United States." The principle change occurred only after World War II when Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, which functioned as a tool to replenish the reserve components. A young man then wishing to avoid Selective Service could either join the Reserves of the National Guard in lieu of two years active duty in the U.S. Army.

Despite the unique features of the State Guard, the Secretary of War remained basically in charge of the training, organization, and supply of State Guard units "while any part of the National Guard of the State concerned is in active federal service." The authority for establishing and maintaining a State Guard was found in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Federal Constitution. Soldiers in State Guard units were considered legitimate combatants and were covered under the rules of war. Likewise, their personal affairs fell within the jurisdiction of the state in which they resided in terms of a Guardsman's obligation to creditors and other civic responsibilities directed by the state.

When the Kansas Guard was federalized and sent to Camp Robinson on 23 December 1940, many of the senior officers were declared unfit for active duty following their physical examinations. This caused quite a stir, particularly when Colonel Charles H. Browne, Sr., the commander of the 137th Infantry was rejected. Colonel Browne did not take this decision lying down, but appealed the medical officers' verdict; consequently, he received another physical at Walter Reed Army Hospital. The findings there, as at Camp Robinson, were the same--unfit for further military service because of hypertension (high blood pressure) due to hardening of the arteries. But Colonel Browne's military career was far from over. The State Military Board appointed him on 8 May to the post of commanding officer of the 1st Regiment of the Kansas State Guard. This also coincided with the start of an active recruitment campaign which culminated with the creation of eight battalions of thirty-three companies for the Kansas State Guard. The State Adjutant General, M.R. McLean, indicated that the State was seeking volunteers between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. The manpower level of the new State Guard was set at 1360 men and 120 officers. Each company was to be located at a site of a National Guard Armory. Unlike regular and National Guard companies, State Guard units were designated according to their locality. Dodge City, Horton, Garden City, and Hiawatha became the first municipalities to have recruiting officers. The Holton Signal claimed on 15 May, "No effort will be made to enlist young men of draft age who might later be called into active service although they are not barred." Apparently, the ideal recruit for the State Guard was a veteran of World War I, and ex-National Guardsmen, or personnel with C.M.T.C. (Campus Military Training Corps) and R.O.T.C. experience.

The recruitment drive, which began in early May, was well underway. Age requirements differed between the ranks. For those seeking commissions as officers, the maximum age was sixty-one, while those in the enlisted ranks were expected to be between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. Age restrictions varied, like the results of the physical examination, during the course of the war to meet manpower needs. In terms of supply, the State Military Board was obligated to furnish uniforms and arms to the State Guard. At times this caused considerable confusion. For AR 850-250, "The uniform prescribed and furnished by the state guard should be unmistakably different from that of any federal military force and from that heretofore authorized for certain units of the National Guard of the several states." Also, the uniform designated was to be marked in such a way as to clearly identify the wearer as a member of the State Guard. The State Guard was not to compete with the War Department in the procurement of uniforms. This even included the selection of sleeve braid. The Kansas State Guard could choose any color other than brown, gold, yellow, black, and forest green that can be "worn on all overcoats, coats and shirts." The Kansas State Guard selected two uniforms. The summer dress uniform was composed of cotton khaki with a black tie. On the left shoulder, a blue and yellow patch was worn to signify membership in the State Guard. The Fruhauf Southwest Uniform Company of Wichita produced the green gabardine winter uniform. A green and yellow triangular patch was used with this uniform. Enlisted brass was taken from surplus stocks from the pre-1917 period. On the other hand, a Kansas City, Missouri firm, the Green Jewelry Company designed and manufactured the officers' brass.

Kansas officials ultimately hoped to attract ex-veterans and National Guard personnel to the ranks of the KSG, but it was not totally closed to other interested parties. Those wishing to join the State Guard were urged to attend organizational meetings held at their local armory. The typical company composed three officers--a Captain, a 1st Lieutenant, and a 2nd Lieutenant--and forty enlisted men. The object was to complete the recruitment as quickly as possible so physicals, uniforms, and other necessary equipment could be ordered. Physicians who performed physicals received a dollar per applicant. Although State authorities originally notified recruits that they should not expect compensation unless the State Guard was activated--and this was unlikely--the Legislature nonetheless did make some form of monetary contribution in recognition of guard service. To underscore this point, the Topeka Capital earlier claimed, "No pay will be allowed unless the State Guard is called into active service, then the pay will be the same provided for officers and men of comparable rank in the United States Army." The Kansas Legislature made a conscious effort to arrange financial remuneration for State Guard personnel. In House Bill, No. 315, after 1 July 1943, the Legislature authorized a pay increase that covered grades E-1 through 0-3. This applied to those who participated in weekly drills for no less than one and a half-hours for no more than five training periods per month. For such service, a private could expect 60 cents, a corporal 80 cents, a 2nd lieutenant $1.25, and a captain $2.50.

By the end of May 1941, twenty-one states, mainly in the West, organized State Guard elements. Additionally, eight states were in the process of establishing units of their own. According to War Department sources, the "status of each member is that of a lawful belligerent as a soldier in the military service of his state." As a consequence, military specialists designed instruction to meet the specific mission and tasks established for the State Guard. Unit commanders were responsible for directing the training sequence to meet that objective on the local level. As in all military units, the battalion and company commanders were accountable for maintaining the appropriate levels of discipline and morale among their troops.

One of the oddest moments in the history of the State Guard occurred when the War Department recalled the Guard's weapons on 11 April 1942. The War Department's decision resulted because of the Allied rifle shortage. The action of the War Department affected not only the State Guard throughout the country, but also the National Rifle Association whose members purchased surplus 1903 Springfields and 1917 Enfields, and regular M.P. units. Both M.P. and State Guard battalions obtained shotguns. According to the War Department, shotguns would "fully meet their requirements." Colonel Browne addressed this problem in a memorandum sent to all State Guard units from his Horton headquarters. He indicated in his circular that the Military Police had already been issued riot guns and it was possible that the State Guard would shortly receive similar weapons. In Paola, the Company turned in their forty rifles, and in the interim, the local American Legion Post agreed to allow the Paola Company to use their ten Krag rifles for training purposes. Finally, the Paola unit acquired an additional twenty-five rifles from a Spanish-American War Veterans organization. But despite these efforts, the Company remained equipped with shotguns. A typical KSG Company was furnished with thirty-eight shotguns and two Thompson submachine guns.

Company level training occurred during weekly drills, the objective being to prepare the Guardsmen with the basics of soldiering. A typical Monday evening assembly in Sabetha, for example, included scouting and patrolling in a combat environment as well as a lecture on chemical warfare by Corporal M.V. Chase, a chemistry teacher from the local high school. The following week the Sabetha company implemented their new found skills in solving an actual tactical problem, which according to the Sabetha Herald, was to be conducted "under simulated combat conditions...if weather permits." This included scouting and patrolling, "extended order deployment and advancing on an enemy will be put into practice by the men." It appeared that regimental headquarters at Horton established the weekly training schedules, since after an examination of local newspapers, a clear pattern of training emerges. All the units in the KSG, for instance, covered a similar instructional format at roughly the same time.

Likewise, special courses were provided for the professional enrichment of officers and enlisted personnel. These classes reviewed a wide range of subjects designed to improve training on the company and battalion levels. A one-day educational session convened in Topeka on 3 May 1942 at the State House. All officers were expected to attend. The cost of the class was paid by the KSG with officers receiving $5.00 per day and 34 a miles for transportation to and from Topeka. The Adjutant General's Office provided room and board. The State Guard not only established professional training facilities, but also held test mobilizations to maintain training at peak levels.

On 9 December 1941, shortly following the declaration of war, Colonel Browne ordered the first statewide test mobilization. Telegrams were sent to all battalion commanders: You are directed to order test mobilization without expense all units your battalion Tuesday, December 9, I to 5 p.m., with guard details established at utilities and other facilities essential to "National Defense. No prior publicity desired. Company commanders will telegram regimental headquarters that evening number of officers and men mobilized, with written report in duplicate forward the following day," --Browne, Colonel.

Almost everyone took part in the exercise. Governor Payne Ratner cancelled his scheduled activities, including groundbreaking ceremonies at the Jayhawk Ordnance Plant at Pittsburg. Ratner called in leading state officials to ascertain what could be done to ensure the security of the State. Brigadier General Robert C. Rodgers, Commanding General of Ft. Riley, suggested that the "most vulnerable points" in the State were bridges. Consequently, the KSG was assigned duty during the mobilization of securing highway bridges and protecting vital defense industries, utilities, and railroads from a simulated enemy attack.

A direct result of the mobilization was an expansion of the State Guard with additional units established in Topeka and Wichita. Simultaneously, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sent a telegram to Governor Rather warning him of possible fifth column activities within the State during the Christmas holidays. Ratner informed the press that "the State Guard would be on duty but would not be mobilized in uniform."

State Guard units conducted their own exercise on the battalion and company level. These drills were used primarily to maintain morale and to dramatize the need for increased professionalism in the ranks. One exercise, no doubt common to other KSG units, occurred at Lake Shawnee on 12 April 1942. The cooperation of the Civil Air Patrol highlighted the maneuvers when during the early phase of the exercise, Captain St. Elmo Else took it upon himself to attack the battalion command post with flour sack "bombs." According to press reports, "some of Kansas' best military minds" were wiped out, including Colonel Browne and General C. I. Martin, the Assistant Adjutant General. Local Guardsmen failed to recognize the plane as hostile and notified the pilot by signal to "drop a message." The message received was not what the Guardsmen expected--"Surrender at once," followed by a series of four flour sack "bombs" which were scored as direct hits on the command post. In critiquing the air raid, Colonel Browne noted that rifle fire would have been more effective as a deterrent than the concentrated fire of machine guns. Browne claimed, "They (riflemen) would fire into the motor; they would shoot the pilot in the cockpit."

Not all State Guard activities were solely devoted to military training but in times of civil emergencies the KSG was there to fill in while the Kansas National Guard was at war. For example, mobilization took place for the Dodge City, Garden City, and Great Bend Companies on 28 April to respond to the flood along the Arkansas River. The cresting of the Arkansas presented a clear danger to those communities in the flood's path, for the waters were higher than they were in 1921 and even reached the Dodge City Armory floor. Through the efforts of the Dodge City Company, 200 homes were evacuated. The Great Bend Company helped rescue roughly 100 families and aided local police and the Highway Patrol in policing the roads and checking the levees along the river. To alleviate the strain and tension among Guard personnel, units worked a schedule of four hours on and four hours off duty. The Great Bend Tribune noted the popularity of KSG, when according to their statement, "only one man in the unit did not report."

The first summer drills for the KSG were jointly held at Topeka,s Free Fair Grounds (now the Kansas Expocentre) and at the State Fair facilities at Hutchinson. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions were assigned to Topeka for five days of training; the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions were sent to Hutchinson. While attending annual training, Guardsmen were put through four days of physical exercise, familiarization and firing of shotguns and Thompson submachine guns, chemical warfare training, hand grenades, and domestic disturbance classes. Regular army instructors conducted most of the syllabi. The troops at the Topeka Camp were fortunate in one respect: women from the Perry Methodist Church under contract to the State of Kansas provided K.P.

At Hutchinson, the training was identical to that at Topeka. The cadre who managed the Topeka Camp traveled with "strong-jawed" Colonel Browne to Hutchinson, where, from accounts in the "Blistered feet and painful sunburn proved they (the Guardsmen) are not hardened soldiers yet." The atmosphere was strictly professional. An intensive period of training took place each day. Every officer and enlisted man stood guard duty as well as fired his weapon, "first at clay pigeons, then...at small parachutes flung from an airplane." According to the local newspaper, an important objective of training was "to teach the men to be tough."

Slowly by 1943, the character of the annual encampments began to change. The first was the extension of the training period to a full week. Likewise, the division of the regiment into two separate training facilities came to an end. That summer, the full regiment trained at the State Fair Grounds in Hutchinson. The reforms which started in 1943 continued until the conclusion of the war. In 1944 and 1945, Annual Training was held at Camp Whiteside, Ft. Riley, with rifles replacing shotguns in 1945. By 1946 the utility of State Guard was nearing an end. The war was over, units returned from overseas, and troops were demobilized. The summer training that year was considered "field training," which may have been indicative of the future role of the Kansas State Guard.

During the war years, the actual strength of the KSG remained relatively stable. By 31 May 1946, the force level of the State Guard stood at 130 officers and 1156 enlisted men. On 1 January 1947, the 1st Regiment of the Kansas State Guard was redesignated as the lst Infantry Group. Colonel Browne was duly promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, fitting compensation for not being assigned to a combat unit. But on 30 June 1948, the Kansas State Guard held its last formation.

In retrospect, the State Guard played a vital role in the success of the war effort. As an organization, it was responsible for the continuation of the duties that were long considered a part of the National Guard. The State Guard's very presence reassured the civil population that they were protected, and consequently, this helped eliminate the wave of local paranoia that occurred in World War I. The State Guard also furnished a useful outlet for those individuals who wished to serve their country, but for some reason were unable to do so. But more importantly, the State Guards' creation indicated that the frontier ethic of providing local security persisted in an age of total war. Even today, the legacy of General Browne is being analyzed for future applicability in Washington and Topeka, to insure the welfare of the citizens of Kansas in a future crisis.

While little was known or has been written on the Kansas State Guard, the 102d Military History Detachment was given a box of records on the State Guard by Warrant Officer Carl Nelson (Ret.), Mr. Nelson, long an enthusiast of Guard history and traditions, saved these irreplaceable documents from certain destruction when the late General Charles Browne's effects were being dispersed. With this resource, SSG Christopher C. Lovett, a bonafide historian, was given the task of writing a monograph on State Guard history. He has done an excellent job of synthesizing the records. It is hoped that this monograph will clarify the role and history of the Kansas State Guard. The Detachment and the Guard owes a great deal to Mr. Nelson for his work in saving these records.

Prepared by Staff Sergeant Christopher C. Lovett, 102d Military History Detachment, Kansas Army National Guard, 5 October 1985